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I. INTRODUCTION
When a government agency works with a private company to
accomplish a goal, the agreement is usually in the form of a government
procurement contract.' Government agencies work with private companies
in order to have access to the most recent research and technologies. 2 These
contracts are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),3 which
outlines the steps an agency must take to ensure that the bidding process is
fair.4 If a company's bid is rejected, it can appeal the decision to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 5 The GAO has the power to
void government procurement contracts.6
When it was created by Congress, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) was given a special power allowing the
Agency to bypass FAR requirements.7 The power is known as NASA's
"other transaction authority" (OTA).8 NASA has used this power to work
with private companies on a wide range of projects. 9 When NASA works
with a company via its OTA power, the agreement that governs the
See Surya Gablin Gunasekara, "Other Transaction' Authority: NASA 's Dynamic Acquisition
Instrument for the Commercialization of Manned Spaceflight or Cold War Relic?, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J.
893, 895-96 (2011) (providing an overview of the procedures that govern government procurement
contracts).
2 See Nancy 0. Dix et al., Fearand Loathing of FederalContracting:Are Commercial Companies
Really Afraid to do Business with the Federal Government? Should They Be?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 5, 7
(2003) (explaining that the government no longer conducts as much research as the private sector does).
3 See Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 896 (providing an overview of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and providing examples of ways the FAR controls the procurement process).
at 895-96 (describing the guidance that agencies must follow in order to ensure
' See generally id.
that FAR guidelines are met).
5 See generally id at 900 (explaining that the power to review bid protests has strengthened
competition).
6 See Michael J. Schaengold et al., Choice of Forumfor FederalGovernment ContractBid Protests,
18 FED. OR. B.J. 243, 269 (2008) (providing an explanation on the Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) power).
7 See Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 894 (discussing the reasons why Other Transaction Authority
(OTA) power is so.unlimited and explaining why OTA power is not subject to FAR requirements).
' David S. Schuman, Space Act Agreements: A Practitioner'sGuide, 34 J. SPACE L. 277, 278
(2008) (providing insight into how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) legal
department uses OTA power).
at 283-84 (showing other examples of SAA use, including: collaborating with Jamestown,
9 See id.
Virginia to develop educational exhibits in commemoration of the 4 0 0 1 anniversary of the landing at
Jamestown, and testing new Olympic swimsuits in preparation of the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing).
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relationship is known as a Space Act Agreement (SAA).' o SAAs are not
subject to FAR requirements and are not subject to GAO review." While
this is good for the Agency, it leaves the companies whose bids are rejected
with nowhere to turn. As the space industry moves towards the private
sector, it is important for NASA to encourage the industry's growth. NASA
should recognize the unfairness of its current practice and provide
companies with an outlet to voice their displeasure with the Agency's
decision. If NASA does not change, private space companies could stop
bidding to work with NASA altogether. NASA could find itself out of the
space race.
This Comment seeks to analyze the history of NASA's OTA power
and how it affects the private space industry today. Part II looks at the
environment that fostered NASA's creation, investigates how the Agency
interpreted its OTA power, and discusses the differences between a typical
government procurement contract and an SAA. Part III seeks to answer
how NASA is using its OTA power today. It includes a statutory and
textual analysis of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space
Act) and explains how a court would interpret the statute. Part III also
explains the GAO's decisions to not allow challenges to NASA's OTA
power. Finally, Part IV looks to the future of commercial space flight and
provides NASA with recommendations on how to provide businesses with
an avenue to question its OTA power.
II. NASA'S CREATION AND HOW THE AGENCY HAS USED ITS OTA POWER
A. The NationalAeronautics and Space Act of 1958
In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first man-made satellite,
Sputnik, into orbit.' 2 The United States was worried that the Soviet Union
would win the space race.' 3 President Eisenhower knew that the United
States had to regain the world's respect and decided to make space
exploration a government program. 14 As a result, Congress passed the
Space Act in 1958.1' The Space Act created NASA. 6 To help NASA
achieve its goal of beating the Soviet Union, the drafters of the Space Act
10 See id. at 280 (discussing NASA's OTA power and its connection to Space Act Agreements

(SSAs).
" See id (explaining that SAAs are not to be used as part of the routine procurement process).
12 Paul G. Dembling, The National Aeronautics And Space Act of 1958: Revisited, 34 J. SPACE L.
203, 203 (2008).
1" See id. (explaining the tense political and social climate in the United States during the "Space
Race").
" See id. at 205-06 (remembering that President Dwight D. Eisenhower originally wanted NASA to
be a part of the Department of Defense but he was ultimately persuaded to make NASA a civilian
agency).
"SId. at 206.
16 See id. (explaining the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space Act)).
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gave NASA its OTA power.' 7 The power was never given to an agency
before, and it represented an unprecedented grant of power.' 8
B. An Overview of the Scope and Use of NASA's OTA Power
NASA has interpreted its OTA power to be very broad and the
Agency has used its power in seemingly every aspect of its operation. 9 The
Agency has used its OTA power "thousands of times" and "use[s] it almost
every day."2 NASA issues three types of SAAs.21 There are reimbursable
SAAs, non-reimbursable SAAs, and funded SAAs.22 A reimbursable SAA
is when NASA gets the costs associated with the agreement reimbursed by
the outside company.2 3 A non-reimbursable SAA is when NASA and the
partners associated with the agreement each bear the cost of their respective
participation.24 Therefore, "there is no exchange of funds between [any of]
the parties."25 A funded SAA is when NASA transfers funds to a domestic
partner in order to accomplish an agency goal.26 These different SAAs
showcase the seemingly infinite ways the Agency can use its OTA power.
SAAs, regardless of what type, are much more flexible to both the Agency
and the company when it comes negotiating to and administering the
agreement.2 7 NASA has the ability to structure agreements differently
according to the type of business with which it seeks to work.28
1. OTA and the COTS Program
NASA decided it would use its OTA power to replace the space
shuttle. When the space shuttle was retired, NASA was left without a way
to carry cargo or astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS).3° The
29

"7 See id. at 210-11 (discussing that the drafters believed that OTA power was unlimited and they
wanted NASA to have the power to overcome any contingency).
'8 See id. at 211 (explaining that the Space Act represented the first time an agency was given OTA

power).

9 See Schuman, supra note 8, at 278 (showing the flexibility OTA power allows).

20

id.

21 Id

at 282.
Id.
23 See generally NASA
22

POLICY

DIRECTIVE

(NPD)

1050.2(l)(d)-(e)

(2013), available at

http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cftn?t--NPD&c=1050&s=2 (discussing the reimbursable SAA).
For reader clarification, this source refers to specific forms of SAAs as Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs). Id.
(2008),
available at
13-14
Guide,
Agreements
Act
generally Space
24 See
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/289016main_Space%20Act%2OAgreements%20Guide%202008.pdf.
25 Schuman, supra note 8, at 282.
26 Id.

27 Dix et al., supra note 2, at 28.
28 See Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 897 (showing NASA's ability to use SAAs to its advantage).
29 See generally NASA Commercial Crew & Cargo Program Office, NASA Commercial Orbital

TransportationServices, NASA, http://nasa.gov/offices/c3po/about/c3po.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015)
(providing an overview of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program and its use
of SAAs).
31 See Tariq Malik, NASA to Fly Astronauts on Russian Spaceships at Nearly $63 Million per Seat,
SPACE.COM (Mar. 14, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.space.com/11125-nasa-russia-soyuz-deal-
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United States government was paying Russia to carry astronauts to the
ISS.3 1 NASA recognized that, in order to remain an international space
power, it needed to turn to the private sector.32 The Agency launched the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program.33 The COTS
program had three main objectives: (1) to implement United States space
policy with an investment to stimulate the private space industry; (2) to
facilitate the private space industry's demonstration of cargo and human
space transportation to make the process cheaper and more reliable; and (3)
to create a market environment that would open space transportation to the
government and ordinary citizens.34 When NASA sent astronauts to the
moon, NASA was the primary customer for contractors.35 Due to
insufficient resources, the COTS program envisioned NASA as a partner in
the new private space market, as opposed to NASA's usual role as the only
player in the space business.36 NASA even believed that it could use COTS
as a vehicle to return to the lunar surface for a new science campaign.37 The
program used SAAs to memorialize the agreements between NASA and the
38
private companies.
The program was a resounding success for NASA. 39 Companies
from all over the country submitted their applications to work with NASA. 4 °
SpaceX and Orbital Sciences, both private space companies, were awarded
SAAs through the COTS program.41 The COTS program, however, was not
limited to SpaceX and Orbital Sciences; many other companies submitted

spaceflights.html (outlining NASA's future options for humans access to space, including the
International Space Station (ISS)).
" Marcia Dunn, $70 Million per Seat? NASA to Pay Russia Huge Sum to Send Astronauts to ISS,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/70-millionper-seat-nasa-russia n 3187481 .html.
32 Valin Thorn, Deputy Manager, NASA's Commercial Crew & Cargo Program, Commercial Crew
and Cargo Program Overview Presentation at the AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting 25 (Jan. 11, 2007),
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/168735main AIAA_2007_COTS.pdf.
" See id. at 4 (explaining the COTS program).
34 id.
35 See Robert M. Kelso, Manager, NASA's Commercial Space Development, Commercial Space

Development - What's the Next? Presentation at ESMD Technology Exchange Conference 10 (Nov. 20,
2007), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf203082mainC3PO%20-TEC%20Briefing%/2ONov 2007.pdf (recalling
when NASA contracted for its own spacecraft, instead of services and capabilities).
36 See id. (explaining that NASA no longer would develop its own spacecraft; NASA would instead
work with a private company).
37 See id. at 13-20 (recalling that NASA believed it could use public interest as leverage to help
attract a public/private partnership that would lower costs and increase scientific return).
31 See Schuman, supra note 8, at 284 (explaining the use of SAAs in the COTS program).
39 NASA COMMERCIAL CREW & CARGO PROGRAM

OFFICE, http://www.nasa.gov/officesc3po/

home/#.VIH6YaTF dc, (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
'0 See Brian Berger, NASA Signs Space Act Agreements with Three More Firms, SPACE.COM (June
19, 2007, 9:38 AM), http://space.com/3975-nasa-signs-space-act-agreements-firrns.html.
"' Chris Bergin, SpaceX and Orbital Win Huge CRS Contract from NASA, NASA
SPACEFLIGHT.COM (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/12/spacex-and-orbital-win-

huge-crs-contract-from-nasa/.
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bids that were rejected by NASA.4 2 Since the program used SAAs, the
companies whose bids were rejected by NASA had nowhere to turn to
question the Agency's decision.
NASA has announced a new program, similar to COTS, called the
Commercial Crew integrated Capability (CCiCAP) program. 43 The program
was launched in 2012 and aims to facilitate safe, reliable, and cost effective
human transportation into space. 44
C. SAAs and Government ProcurementContracts:A Comparison
1. Federal Acquisition Regulation
When an agency contracts with a private company for a product that
the agency has a direct need or use for, that contract is subject to the FAR.4 5
The FAR establishes how agencies communicate with companies, how
contracts are awarded, and how these contracts are administered. 46 The
purpose of the FAR is to ensure that a company working with the
government is satisfied "in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the
delivered product or service .
"...,,4'
These goals are achieved through
maximizing the use of commercial products, using contractors with
successful past performances, and promoting competition. 48 The FAR also
stresses "[c]onduct[ing]
business with integrity, fairness, and
openness ....",49

2. When an Agency Must Follow the FAR
The government must use a procurement contract "when the
principal purpose of the [agreement] is the acquisition of property or
services for the direct ... use of the . . . [g]overnment."50 SAAs can be
"used when the . . . purpose of the transaction is to transfer money ... or
services" with the goal of supporting or stimulating a public purpose.5 '
42 Chris Bergin, Orbital Beat a Dozen Competitors to

Win NASA COTS Contract, NASA
(Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/02/orbital-beat-a-dozencompetitors-to-win-nasa-cots-contract/.
43 See Phillip McAlister, Director, NASA's Commercial Spaceflight, Presentation of CCiCAP
Announcement Summary Portfolio 2 (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/672130mainCCiCap
%20Announcement.pdf (outlining the goals of the CCiCAP project).
' See id.
at 3, 8-13 (explaining the origins and objectives of the program).
45 Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 895-96.
46 id. at 89A
47 Federsl Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(b) (2013).
SPACEFLIGHT.COM

48

Id.

41 See id.
§ 1.102(b)(3) (showing that transparency is also very important to the FAR).
50 Courtney B. Graham, Associate General Counsel, NASA's Commercial and Intellectual Property
Practice Group, Presentation of NASA Recent Developments: Space Act Agreements vs. Contracts 4,
http://americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/science-technology/101 11 ll-spaceact_ppt.auth
checkdam.pdf.
"' Id. (showing when SAAs, as opposed to a procurement contract, can be used by NASA).
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3. NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
In addition to the FAR, when NASA enters into a contract that is
not a SAA, it also must abide by the NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (NFS).52 The NFS provides additional processes that the
Agency must go through in order to contract with a company.13 The FAR
and NFS both have requirements for how an agency must alert companies to
contract bids, ensure competition among companies, and provide for a
challenge system for companies whose bids are not accepted.5 4 The FAR
and NFS both allow companies to file protests before the GAO. 55 SAAs,
however, are not subject to any of the FAR or NFS requirements. 6
4. The COTS Program
NASA was able to decide which companies it wanted to work with
under the COTS program. 7 Exploration Partners, which was not selected for
the program, and Rocketplane Kistler (Rocketplane), filed challenges before
the GAO.5 8 The GAO decided that it did not have jurisdiction to review
SAAs. 9 The GAO said that it would allow timely challenges if a company
believed that an agency misused its OTA power.6" The GAO held that
NASA did have the authority to use SAAs for the COTS program.6
D. The GAO's Decision and Chevron Deference
When a reviewing body is tasked with determining whether an
agency's interpretation of ambiguous language is valid, the agency's
interpretation will be accepted as long as it is reasonablIe. When deciding
if an agency's interpretation is reasonable, the reviewing body will conduct
the "Chevron two-step."63 The first step is to see if the intent of Congress is
52 Gunasekara, supra note 1,at 896.

s See id (explaining that the NASA Far Supplement (NFS) and the FAR force NASA to ensure it

conducts its business in a certain way).
" See Schuman, supra note 8, at 279-80 (outlining NASA's obligation to business under the FAR

and NFS).
5 Id. at 280.
See id (showing the benefits of using a SAA).
7 See generally Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211 (Comp.

56

Gen. Dec. 19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10 (Comp. Gen.
Jan. 28, 2008).
" See generally Exploration Partners, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211; Rocketplane Kistler,

2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10.
9 ExplorationPartners,2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *8-9.
6 See id. at *10 (showing that the GAO did decide that it would review an agency's use of OTA

power if a company thought a procurement contract was required for a given situation).
61

See Rocketplane Kistler, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *5 (holding that NASA did not

need to use a procurement contract during the COTS program).
62 Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative InterpretationsofLaw, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
511 (1989); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984).
65 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 834 (2001)
(explaining what questions a court would ask when engaging in the "Chevron two-step procedure").
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clear. 64 If the court feels that Congress' intent is clear, then it must follow
the intent of Congress and strike down the agency's interpretation.65 If
Congress' intent is unclear, however, the court moves on to step two. 66 The
question then becomes if the agency's interpretation "is based on a
permissible construction of the statute., 67 The decision is based on the idea
that if Congress included ambiguous language in a statute, it intended it as a
delegation to the agency.6 8 When ambiguous language is present, the court
cannot replace the agency's interpretation with its own, unless the agency's
interpretation is arbitrary or capricious. 69 An interpretation is arbitrary or
capricious when there is no rational connection between the agency decision
and the relevant factors.7 °
E. When Does Chevron Deference Apply?
In addition to the "Chevron two-step," a court must first engage in
"Chevron step-zero" to determine if Chevron deference applies to the
situation at hand.7 When first decided, Chevron deference was understood
to apply only to agency interpretation of statutes.
A different form of
deference applies when an agency makes interpretations through informal
agency decisions.73 Skidmore deference is weaker than Chevron deference
and only requires courts to consult the agency interpretation and consider if
it is "longstanding, consistent, and well-reasoned."74 Chevron deference
will be given to an agency action when that action flows from the use of
formal procedures or is "based on . . . evidence of what Congress
intended."75
F. Energy Conversion Devices: The GAO's First OTA Question
Energy Conversion Devices (ECD) was the first company to go

6 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (discussing the first analytic step to see if an agency will be
given deference).
65

ld

See id at 843 (discussing what a court should do if Congressional intent is unclear).
Id.
68 See id.
at 843-44 (explaining the thought process behind agency deference).
6

67

69

Id.at 844.

"0 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 4243 (1983) (explaining when a court can overturn an agency interpretation).
"' See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006) (explaining the
changing attitude of the Supreme Court after the Chevron decision).
72 See Scalia, supranote 62, at 511.
7 Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: ConceptualizingSkidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron,
42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1118 (2001).
74See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Rossi, supranote 73, at 1117 (explaining
that Skidmore deference is a form of "weak deference"); Sunstein, supra note 71, at 211 (suggesting
courts would take into consideration agency interpretations if they were "longstanding, consistent, and
well-reasoned").
11 Sunstein, supra note 71, at 213-14.
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before the GAO and question an agency's OTA power.7 6 ECD was
protesting its rejection by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA)." DARPA issued a broad program that sought proposals for new
film technology.78 ECD's bid was rejected and the company filed a protest
before the GAO "challenging the evaluation of the technical and cost
proposals, the decision not to conduct discussions with the [bidding
companies], and the decision" to not use a procurement contract for the
project.7 9 DARPA argued that the purpose of the program "was not to
acquire goods [or] services[,]" but simply to advance the United States'
technological capabilities.8" ECD said that DARPA was only allowed to use
OTA power "when the use of a standard [procurement] contract ...[was]
not feasible ... ."81 ECD was unable to show that the purpose of the
program was to acquire goods and services "for the direct benefit of the
[agency]." 82 This was the first time the GAO decided that it did not have the
jurisdiction to review agreements that were made via OTA power.83
G. The GAO and ExplorationPartners
The first SAA protest that the GAO received was from Exploration
Partners.84 When NASA announced the COTS program, it released certain
specifications that the bidders had to meet.85 Exploration Partners believed
that it was the only company that could meet all of the program's
requirements, and was surprised when NASA rejected its bid.86 The
company turned to the GAO.87
The GAO looked at the statutory language of the Space Act.88 Since
Congress listed both "contracts" and "other transactions" in the statute,
Congress could not have intended them to mean the same thing. 89 NASA
76 Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 901-02; see also Energy Conservation Devices, Inc., B-260514,
1995 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 399, *1 (Comp. Gen. June 16, 1995).
" See Energy ConservationDevices, Inc., 1995 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 399, at *1 (discussing why
Energy Conversion Devices was before the GAO).
71See id.
at *2 (explaining the project that Energy Conversion Devices wanted to be a part of).
"9 Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 902.
go See Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 1995 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 399, at *6 (explaining the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) rebuttal to Energy Conversion Devices'
challenge).

s' See id.at *7.
82 See id.
at *8 (explaining the GAO's decision).
83 See Gunasekara, supra note 1,at 901-03 (providing the historical importance of the GAO's

decision).
84See id. at 901-03 (examining the first three GAO OTA complaints in which the latter two were
SAA complaints); see also Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at
*3 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 19, 2006) (explaining that the GAO never received a challenge to NASA's OTA
before).
" See Exploration Partners, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *4 (showing that the COTS
program was specifically structured).
86 Id.at *5.
87 See id.at * 1-2. (discussing Exploration Partners' decision to challenge NASA's decision).
88 Id. at *7-9.
89

See id. at *8 (discussing Congress's intent in drafting the Space Act).
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argued that procurement contracts and SAAs are not the same thing.9" The
GAO had to decide whether NASA's use of its OTA power was an "award
of [a] contract[] for the procurement of goods and services."'" The GAO's
92
analysis of the question began and ended with its look at the statute itself.
The GAO explained that "a cardinal principle of statutory construction" is to
assume that "no clause, sentence, or word" in a statute is "superfluous, void,
or insignificant." 93 Since Congress clearly separated "contracts" and "other
transactions," they could not mean the same thing. 94 The GAO also told
NASA that its OTA power was not unlimited. 95 The GAO explained that it
would hear timely protests if a company believed that an agency was using
its OTA power when it should have been using a procurement contract.96
H. The GAO and Rocketplane Kistler
The next time the GAO would hear a challenge about NASA's OTA
power, the company would argue that NASA needed a government
procurement contract to engage companies in the COTS program. 97
Rocketplane argued that the COTS program was for the direct benefit of
NASA because the Agency was using the program as a way to conduct
research and development.98 NASA explained that the purpose of the COTS
program was to encourage the growth of the commercial space industry in
the United States.99 NASA said that the program could not be about
research and development because the Agency was not using any of the
research from the participating companies. l00 The GAO decided that
NASA's use of OTA power during the COTS program was permissible.'0 l
I. The GAO and Competitiveness Concerns: The Case of Blue Origin
NASA's OTA power has found its way to the front page recently, as
Blue Origin, a private space venture backed by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos,
brought a challenge before the GAO, alleging that NASA behaved in an
anti-competitive way. 1°2 NASA was selling a launch complex and decided
90 See id. at *8-9 (explaining that Congress separated "other transaction" and "contract," signaling a
different meaning).
9' See id. at *6 (explaining the main question the GAO had to decide).
92 See id. at *8 (discussing how the GAO answered the key question in the case).
93 Id.
I See id. (explaining how the GAO decided that SAAs and procurement contracts are not the same).
91 See id. at *8-9 (holding that NASA's OTA power is limited).
96 Id. at *10.
97 Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *4-5 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 28,
2008).
91 See id. (showing Rocketplane's rationale in arguing that a procurement contract was required).
99 See id. at *8 (discussing how the GAO answered the key question in the case).
100Id. at *8-9.
101See id. at *9-11 (holding that the use of SAAs for the COTS program was allowed because NASA
did not acquire any goods or services).
102 See Blue Origin, L.L.C., B-408823, 2013 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 252, at *17-21 (Comp. Gen.
Dec. 12, 2013); Alan Boyle, Billionaires' Battle for Historic Launch Pad Goes into Overdrive, NBC
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to accept bids from private space companies.103 SpaceX won the bid. 1°4
Blue Origin explained that, while NASA had listed certain requirements in
the bid announcement, NASA's Administrator had made public remarks
about the bidding process that mentioned different requirements." °5 The
GAO did not see a definitive preference that NASA manifested during the
bidding process and thus gave deference to the Agency's interpretation of
10 6
the bid announcement.

III. NASA's INTERPRETATION OF ITS OTA POWER AND THE GAO's
AUTHORITY TO REVIEW

A. A Look at NASA's OTA Power Through the Lens of Statutory
Construction andLegislative History

When a statute's meaning is ambiguous, courts or other reviewing
bodies look to the "language, structure, and history" of the statute to try and
ascertain Congressional intent.0 7 Section 202 of the Space Act enables
NASA's Administrator "to enter into and perform such contracts, leases,
cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the
conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate .... 18
"[T]he most prominent [idea] of the role of courts [when it comes to]
statutory construction [is to assume that] the judges are agents of the
legislature."'0 9 Judges must apply legislative commands and trace their
decisions back to an authoritative text. 1 0
B. Should NASA 's Interpretationof "Other TransactionAuthority" Be

Given Chevron Deference?
When ambiguous language is contained in an agency's governing
statute, a reviewing court gives deference to the agency's interpretation of
that language."' Even if NASA was interpreting language that was not in
NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 10:15 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/billionaires-battle-historic-

launch-pad-goes-overtime-f8C 1155810.
103 See Boyle, supra note 102 (discussing the competing bids for launch pad 39A).
104 Alan Boyle, Space X Wins NASA's Nod to Take Over HistoricLaunch Pad39A, NBC NEWS (Dec.
13, 2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/spacex-wins-nasas-nod-take-over-historiclaunch-pad-39a-f2D 11741834.
'o5 See Blue Origin, 2013 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 252, at *4 (discussing the anti-competitive
behavior of NASA).
" See id. at *23 (holding that NASA's behavior was acceptable).
.07See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 414
(1989) (discussing the tools of statutory construction and interpretation).
"' National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 51 U.S.C. § 20113(e) (2014).
109 Sunstein, supra note 107, at 415-16.
10 See id. at 415 (discussing the relationship between the courts, legislature, and statutory
interpretation).
11' Scalia, supra note 62, at 511; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat'l Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (holding that an agency's interpretation of ambiguous language will likely be
upheld by a reviewing court).
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its governing statute, it still would be afforded deference by a reviewing
body.112 In NASA's case, the ambiguous language it is interpreting is the
meaning of "other transaction".
1. Applying the Chevron Two-Step to NASA
Since NASA is an administrative agency, a Chevron analysis is
required to determine if its interpretation of the Space Act is entitled to
deference.' 13 When an agency engages in interpretation, it is helpful to look
at the legislative history.' 1 4 One drafter of the Space Act remarked that he
felt it was his job to give NASA all the power it required to make the United
States preeminent in outer space activities." 5 The drafter also remarked that
the phrase "other transaction" was used in order to cover everything else
that was raised by the other drafters." 6 This is evidence of the broad power
that Congress assumed the agency would need, and is likely how NASA
decided that it could use OTA power in numerous ways. NASA can argue
that its interpretation should be given Chevron deference because it flows
from the intent of Congress that the power be broad." 7 This argument
should get NASA past Chevron step zero." 8 It is also likely that a court will
see "other transaction authority" as ambiguous language." 9 NASA satisfies
step one of the "Chevron two-step."' 2 ° Since NASA passes step one, as long
as the Agency's interpretation is deemed permissible, a court will defer to
the Agency and will not overturn the interpretation. 2'
2. The Space Act and Textual Canons
NASA also likely uses a contextual approach, meaning that the
Agency not only looks to legislative history, but also to the structure of the
statute itself.122 When deciding how expansive its OTA power is, NASA

112 See

Merrill & Hickman, supranote 63, at 836.
1" See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (discussing when an agency interpretation is entitled to judicial
deference).
114 See Sunstein, supra note 107, at 429 (explaining that looking at the legislative history of a statute
may provide insight into why Congress included ambiguous language).
115 See Dembling, supra note 12, at 211 (recalling the reasons why "other transaction" language was
used in the Space Act).
116 See id. (discussing what the drafters of the Space Act intended "other transaction" to mean and
why it was phrased in that way).
117 See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 190 (hypothesizing how NASA would argue that its interpretation
of "other transaction" should be afforded Chevron deference).
118 See id. at 191 (discussing that Chevron step zero requires a court to determine what kinds of
agency interpretations are afforded Chevron deference).
119See id. at 190-91 (explaining that courts will see if Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at
hand).
120 See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 190-91 (explaining that step one of the "Chevron two-step"

requires a court to ask whether the intent of Congress is clear).
121
122

Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 107, at 424-26 (explaining the contextual approach).
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likely applies textual canons. 23 Textual canons can provide the Agency
with general rules for understanding the actual text of the statute. 24 The
most basic textual canon is the plain meaning rule. 125 This requires the
agency to look at the actual meaning of the words in the statute. 2 6 NASA
used the plain meaning rule when arguing that the GAO did not have the
127
jurisdiction to take up Exploration Partners' bid protest.
More in-depth textual canons include noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis.128 These Latin phrases translate to "it is known by its associates"
and "of the same kind or class[,]" respectively. 129 NASA would look to the
surrounding text of the statute to determine what "other transaction" is
applicable to. 3 ' NASA would cite Section 203 of the Space Act's list of
powers granted to the Administrator: "enter into . . . contracts, leases,
131
cooperative agreements, [or] other transactions[.]"'
NASA could apply noscitur a sociis and argue that the drafters
intended the Agency's OTA power to allow the Agency to enter into
agreements with companies.
Since the drafters placed the "other
transaction" phrase after "contracts, leases, and cooperative agreements,"
NASA could argue that "other transaction" should be understood through
the words with which it is surrounded.'32 "Other transaction" would be
"known by its associates" and would apply to entering into agreements. If a
word or sentence has no real significance taken alone, noscitur a sociis
allows for a court to imply significance from its use and placement in
connection with the specific statute. 33 Words cannot be taken out of the
statute and be interpreted in isolation. 34 Words are placed together in a
statute for a deliberate reason, and therefore, must be interpreted together.'35
123 See id. at 452-53 (describing textual canons as useful tools to help agencies and courts determine
Congressional intent).
124 See id. (explaining how textual canons can be useful to agencies and courts when they engage in
statutory interpretation).
121 See id.at 410 (discussing that the plain meaning rule requires agencies or courts to look at the
words of the statute to determine Congressional intent).
126 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (holding that when the language of a statute
cannot possibly mean more than one thing, the intent of Congress is clear); see also Sunstein, supra note
107, at 410 (explaining the steps that an agency or court would follow when using the plain meaning
rule).
127 See Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *8-9 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 19, 2006) (holding that the intent of Congress was clear).
128 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2466 n.285 (2003)
(discussing additional textual canons that a court or agency could use).
129 See id.
(explaining what the ideas behind noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis are, respectively).
130 See id. (providing an explanation of how a court or agency could look to the surrounding language
in a statute to try to ascertain the intent of Congress).
13'National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 51 U.S.C § 20113(e) (2014).
' See Manning, supra note 128, at 2466 n.285 (providing an example of how a court would utilize
noscitur a sociis).
133 See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 125 (2013) (explaining that a court could put words
together to help find Congressional intent).
134 id.
135 See id.(remembering there is always a reason why words are placed together).
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NASA could also apply ejusdem generis to argue the intent of the
drafters. This canon would require a court to read "other transaction" in
light of the words associated with it.' 36 The court would not read "other
transaction" to mean things that lacked relevant similarity to the words that
surround it in the statute.'37 The court would ascertain what Congress was
aiming to say by placing "other transaction" amongst contracts, leases, and
agreements, and would not interpret "other transaction" to apply to things
that lacked similarity to contracts, leases, and agreements. 38 This would be
a good argument for NASA, as using OTA power to grant SAAs is related
to the purposes of entering into contracts, leases, and agreements. NASA
should be aware, however, that the legal environment is shifting away from
textual canons.'

39

3. The Text of the Space Act Itself
Textualism would provide the Agency with another way to interpret
its OTA power broadly. 4 ' Textualism looks at the language in the statute
itself. 4' If a court can apply its own interpretation through legislative
history, it usurps power from the legislative branch because the law that
Congress passed could be overridden.'4 2
Textualists also believe that if the agency were held to the language
in the statute itself, companies that were regulated by it would be better
suited to prepare for challenges; everyone has access to the language,
whereas not everyone has access to or knows how to find legislative
history. 43 NASA, however, would argue that textualist review is inadequate
because the meaning of words is based on cultural and contextual
understanding.'" The words in a statute depend on the context in which
Congress wanted them to be understood. 45 If words are only taken at their
dictionary definition, without regard for context or legislative history, some
136 See Manning, supra note 128, 2466 n.285 (explaining what using the textual canon ejusdem
generis entails).
...See id. (hypothesizing that a court would read "other transition" to mean something similar to the
words that surround it in the Space Act).
...See id. (describing a hypothetical court not interpret a prohibition on animals in a park to apply to
humans due to lack of similarity).
139 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 107, at 415-16 (warning that textual canons may not be as useful
for statutory interpretation because of the seemingly endless supply of them).
140 See id. at 416 (providing an additional way for NASA to interpret its OTA in a broad way).
141 Id. at415-16.
142 See William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 649 (1990) (discussing

how legislative history can actually give power to certain branches of government that the Constitution
did not intend).
141 See Sunstein, supra note 107, at 416 (explaining the policy implications of allowing courts and
agencies to use legislative history during statutory interpretation).
'4 See id. (suggesting that NASA would agree with the author of the Sunstein article because both
would argue that words alone would not show what the intent of Congress really was when it granted
NASA "other transaction" authority).
145 See id. at 416-17 (explaining that words need to be read in the way that Congress intended them
to be read).
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problems may arise.' 4 6 The interpreting court may be too lenient with the
definition, leading to an over-inclusiveness that Congress never intended the
statute to have. 147
This phenomenon has an opposite approach also, the possibility of
under-inclusiveness. 148 A court could interpret a word too closely and miss
that the purpose of the statute went far beyond the common meaning of the
word. 149 These examples highlight that statutes are a mixture of text and
purpose. Congress can leave gaps in statutes to let an agency or the courts
make the law. 5 ' This allows Congress to pass general statutes and let
bodies that have expertise in a particular area make the statute more
specific.' 5 ' If the statute is purposely left open-ended, textualism fails
because the very premise of the idea is uprooted. 5 2 Courts need to look to
other things when the law is broad.153 This is the scenario that NASA faces;
a broad statute that Congress left semi-open-ended, so that the Agency could
grow and adapt. 5 4 A purely textualist approach to NASA's OTA power
would not be as helpful as one looking to the legislative history or applying
textual canons.'
C. The GAO's Decision not to Review SAAs: Why NASA Won
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, and the GAO's own
1 56
bid protest regulations, tell the GAO what it can and cannot review.
Generally, the GAO can review awards of contracts by agencies for the
procurement of goods and services.'7 The GAO has decided that SAAs are
not contracts for the procurement of goods and services and are therefore
146 See id at 418-22 (discussing the problems that may arise if courts read words only by their
dictionary meaning and paid no regard to what Congress actually intended them to mean).
' See id. at 419 (providing an example of a town's statute that banned vehicles in a park but the
town then built a World War II monument involving tanks and explaining that an over inclusive
textualist approach would lead a court to find that the monument was in violation of the statute).
141 See id. at 420-21 (explaining that courts may fear interpreting a statute too broadly and would
hold that a statute does not apply to a situation that Congress actually intended it to apply to).
149 See id. at 420-22 (explaining that under inclusiveness could have a profound effect on how a
statue is enforced).
...See id. at 421-22 (discussing how Congress frequently leaves statutes open-ended when it wants
to delegate lawmaking power).
151 See id. at 421 (analyzing why Congress decides to leave statutes open ended).
152 See id. at 421-22 (discussing that the entire thought process behind textualist review is not
applicable to a statute that Congress intentionally left open ended).
'53 See id. at 422 (explaining why textualism fails when Congress leaves a statute intentionally open
ended).
154See Dembling, supranote 12, at 211 (recalling the reasons why the drafters wanted the Space Act
to be broad).
! See id. (opining that the Space Act was left intentionally broad and ambiguous by Congress).
156 See Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see also Exploration
Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *6 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 19, 2006)
(discussing the jurisdiction of the GAO in regards to government procurement contracts and SAAs).
"' Exploration Partners, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *6 (explaining that the GAO
typically only has jurisdiction to review government procurement contracts that result in the government
obtaining goods or services).
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outside of the GAO's bid protest jurisdiction.158 Once a formal protest is
filed before the GAO dealing with a procurement contract, there is an
automatic stay provision that prevents the contract from being awarded until
59
the GAO has ruled on the matter.
The GAO explained that "an ...agency must use a procurement
contract when.., the... purpose of the [contract] is to acquire... property
or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government...
or . . . [if] the agency decides . . . that a procurement contract is
appropriate.' 16 ° The GAO explained that the COTS program was not about
NASA obtaining any goods or services. 6 '
The question that Rocketplane and Exploration Partners must be
wondering is when exactly NASA is obtaining goods or services. 62 Had a
third company brought a protest before the GAO, they should frame their
Even though the COTS
argument much like Rocketplane did.' 63
announcement did not contain a request for the procurement of vehicles, the
announcement did make clear that the program was intended to eventually
lead to a contract with NASA to service the ISS. 64 A retroactive look at the
COTS program shows that NASA did intend to obtain a vehicle because
NASA was no longer developing a spacecraft of its own. 165 Once NASA
was told that it would not be given the money to develop a ship of its own,
the Agency quickly made the COTS program its avenue to get back to
space.' 66 The problem here for Exploration Partners and Rocketplane is that
67
their decisions were handed down in 2006 and 2008 respectively.1
President Obama did not force NASA to cancel its spacecraft development
until 2010.168 If the COTS program were to be re-administered today, there
at *8-9 (holding that the GAO does not have jurisdiction to review SAAs because there is
' See id.
no exchange of goods or services).
159 Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 900.
'6 Exploration Partners,2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *10.
161See id.at *5 (observing that NASA did not obtain any vehicles during the COTS program).
162 See Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *9 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 28,
2008) (holding that there was no need for a government procurement contract since NASA did not obtain
any goods or services).
63 See, e.g., id.at *4-5 (arguing that NASA did obtain vehicles via the COTS program and should
have used a government procurement contract).
"6 See id.at *3 (citing that the COTS announcement foresaw the potential for NASA to acquire a
spacecraft).
165 See Tariq Malik, NASA Grieves Over Canceled Program,NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2010, 10:12 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.coml/id/35209628/ns/technology-and-science-space/t/nasa-grieves-over-canceledprogram/ (explaining that President Obama's 2010 budget directed NASA to cancel its efforts to build
the new vehicles).
" See Kenneth Chang, Obama Calls for End to NASA's Moon Program,N.Y. TIMES (February 1,
O
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/science/02nasa.htinl? r- (discussing how NASA's plan
shifted from developing a new spacecraft to using private space companies and other countries to ferry
cargo and astronauts to and from the International Space Station).
167See generally Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *6
(Comp. Gen. Dec. 19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler,2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10.
161See Chang, supra note 166 (showing that President Obama's 2010 budget proposal asked for $18
billion over five years, but only for new types of engines and for refueling technologies).
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is little doubt that the purpose of the program would be for NASA to have
access to a new spacecraft.'6 9 The GAO said that, since NASA was not
using any of the vehicles from the program, there was no research or
development on the Agency's behalf.'7 The only way NASA can reach the
ISS today is by using the vehicles that SpaceX and Orbital Sciences
developed during the COTS program.17 This demonstrates that COTS did
provide NASA with goods and services that directly benefited the
Agency.' 72
D. Was The GAO Right?: Why Its Decision not to Review Leads to AntiCompetitive Concerns
The GAO's decisions are harmful to the private space industry
because they allow NASA to use the private sector as a research and
development hub.173 NASA outlined the COTS program in its Human
Spaceflight Transition Plan.174 NASA believed that the program would
allow the Agency to work with private space companies and have them
prove their ability to service the ISS.' 75 NASA said that the purpose of the
COTS program was to implement policies that would allow the Agency to
invest in the commercial space industry "with the goal of achieving safe,
reliable, cost effective [sic] access to .. .orbit ....""'6 One could read
NASA's goals as proving that the Agency was, in fact, using the companies
who were chosen for the COTS program to research and develop a new
space vehicle that NASA could use.' 77 The COTS program did result in
NASA obtaining new space vehicles that it uses to service the ISS. ' While

"' See generally id.(showing that NASA was asking Congress to approve funds so it could work
with private space companies).
70 See Rocketplane Kistler, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *8-9 (holding that since NASA did
not obtain any vehicles directly from the COTS program it was not required to use a government
procurement contract).
...See Cargo Ship Cygnus Leaves InternationalSpace Station, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://theguardian.com/science/2014/feb/i 8/cargo-ship-cygnus-leaves-international-space-station.
172This is in direct opposition to the argument NASA made in Rocketplane. See Rocketplane Kistler,
2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *7-8 (citing NASA's argument that the COTS program would
result in no vehicles that NASA would use).
' See generally Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at *6
(Comp. Gen. Dec. 19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10.
174See NASA, HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT TRANSITION PLAN 23 (2006), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/315546main-space flighttransition.plan.pdf (outlining NASA's plan for the
COTS program and the future of the agency's spaceflight plan).
"' See generally id.(showing that the Agency did anticipate working with private companies to
replace the Space Shuttle).
17'Kelso, supranote 35, at 3.
"7 See Miriam Kramer, Cygnus vs. Dragon: How Two PrivateSpaceships Measure Up, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/cygnus-vs-dragon-how-two-privatespaceships-measure-f4Bl 1185252 (proving that NASA did obtain vehicles from the COTS program).
' See id.(showing that SpaceX and Orbital Sciences are currently servicing the International Space
Station).
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the COTS program has been successful for SpaceX' 79 and Orbital
Sciences, 8 ' businesses that were not chosen to participate have no avenue to
challenge NASA's decision.' 81 Preparing a COTS bid is expensive, and
when NASA decides against a bid, that company faces severe financial
hardship.' 82 The COTS program is now over, and NASA is looking to the
next phase of commercial space flight.' 83 The CCiCAP program will apply
the COTS model, but will focus on human spaceflight instead of cargo
spaceflight.' 84 NASA has already decided that it will be using SAAs to
The program is already
partner with companies for CCiCAP.' 85
underway.' 86 NASA expects CCiCAP to continue until 2014.187
NASA also has plans for the next phase of CCiCAP, the
Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) phase.' 8' CCtCap
contains an interesting decision by NASA; the use of a government
procurement contract instead of an SAA. 89 A company that is awarded a
procurement contract via CCtCap will be allowed to transport NASA
astronauts to and from the ISS. 190 If CCtCap existed during the COTS
program, it would have provided Exploration Partners and Rocketplane with
an example to prove that NASA could have used a typical government
procurement contract when working with private space companies. 9 ' While
it may be too late for the failed COTS companies, if a failed CCtCap
"' See Press Release, John Yembrick & Josh Byerly, NASA Awards Space Station Commercial
Resupply Services Contracts, NASA (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/dec/
HQC08-069ISSResupply.html (showing that NASA and SpaceX signed a $1.6 billion contract).
0 See id. (showing that NASA and Orbital Sciences signed a $1.9 billion contract).
...See Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *9 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 28,
2008) (explaining that the GAO decided that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the rejected bids
from the COTS program).
182 See Jeff Froust, Farewell, Rocketplane, NEWSPACE JOURNAL (July 7, 2010, 8:56 PM),
(showing that Rocketplane went
http://www.newspacejoumal.com/2010/07/07/farewell-rocketplane/
bankrupt after its failed COTS bid).
1"3See Jeff Froust, Life After COTS, THE SPACE REVIEW (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.thespace
review.com/article/2406/1 (reviewing the COTS program and looking forward to NASA's next steps).
"8 See McAlister, supra note 43, at 2 (providing a comparison between the COTS program and the
CCiCAP program).
...Memorandum from David Shreve, Agreements Officer, NASA, to All Prospective Participants
(Feb. 7, 2012) available at https://prod.nais.nasa.gov/eps/epsdata/149848-SOL-001-001.pdf.
186 See Dan Leone, Boeing, SpaceX and Sierra Nevada Stay in Race for Commercial Crew, SPACE
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.spacenews.com/article/boeing-spacex-and-sierra-nevada-stay-racecommercial-crew (providing an overview of NASA's new CCiCAP program and explaining that NASA
has already invested nearly one billion dollars in three companies).
187 See Dan Leone, NASA Orders More Development Work Under Commercial Crew Contracts,
SPACE NEWS (August 26, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/36943nasa-orders-moredevelopment-work-under-commercial-crew-contracts.
188 See Yves-A. Grondin, NASA Outlines its Plans for Commercial Crew Certification, NASA
SPACEFLIGHT.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/08/nasa-outlines-planscommercial-crew-certification/ (discussing NASA's new program and its goals).
189 See id. (discussing that NASA decided to use a government procurement contract for the CCtCap
program).
9 See id.
'9' See generally Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10 (Comp. Gen.
Jan. 28, 2008).
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company wanted to bring a challenge it would be interesting to see if the
GAO addressed the difference between CCtCap and COTS when rendering
its decision, or whether the GAO would simply address CCtCap and ignore
the COTS program. If the GAO had to explain the difference between
CCtCap and COTS, it could only discuss how one used SAAs and the other
used procurement contracts.1 92 Based on NASA's predictions for the
program, at least a few companies vying for a CCtCap contract will be
rejected.'9 3 While NASA is working with three companies under CCiCAP,
it predicts that it will only be able to offer CCtCap contracts to two of
them.194 By allowing NASA to use its OTA power basically unchecked,195
the GAO has created an environment that is anti-competitive and harmful
for business. 196 The FAR exists to prevent the government from acting in an
anti-competitive manner. 97
The different paths that a company can take after rejection vary
drastically, depending on if a government procurement contract was utilized.
The GAO has reviewed government procurement contracts between NASA
and private space companies before.' 98 The breadth of the GAO's decision
in a matter dealing with a procurement contract compared with an SAA is
astounding.' 99 The GAO includes a detailed discussion about every factor
the company challenging the award feels is unreasonable. 200 At least
PlanetSpace, the company that challenged NASA's procurement contract
with Orbital Sciences, got an explanation of where its bid went awry.20'
Exploration Partners and Rocketplane were never told why their bids were
rejected.20 2 Since PlanetSpace was challenging a procurement contract and
92 Compare Exploration Partners, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211, at * 1-12 (examining the case
under a SAA) with Grondin, supra note 188 (stating that CCtCap will use a procurement contract).
19 See Grondin, supra note 188 (showing that there will be companies that will be rejected from

NASA's latest program).
"9 See id. (predicting there will be at least one company who could challenge NASA's rejection of its
bid for the CCtCap program).
195 See Rocketplane Kistler, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10, at *5 (holding that the GAO could not
review NASA's rejection of COTS program bids because they were not subject to the GAO's
jurisdiction).
196 See id (providing an example of two companies that were never told why their bids were denied
by NASA); see also Blue Origin, L.L.C., B-408823, 2013 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 252, at *5 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 12, 2013) (providing an example of a company who was unable to submit a competitive bid
because NASA did not provide clear guidelines about the bidding process).
197See Gunasekara, supra note 1, at 896.
...PlanetSpace Inc., B-401016; B-401016.2, 2009 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 90, at *3 (Comp. Gen.
Apr. 2009) (providing an example of the GAO reviewing a NASA procurement contract).
'99 See generally id. at *10-17 (showing the different analytic techniques that the GAO uses when
reviewing a government procurement contract as opposed to an SAA).
" See generally id. at 18-39 (citing the in-depth discussion the GAO engages in when it determines
whether NASA acted accordingly during a project that was governed by a government procurement
contract).
20' See generally id (showing that the GAO provided a step by step comparison of PlanetSpace's bid
with other bids that NASA did not reject).
202 See generally Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10 (Comp. Gen.
Jan. 28, 2008).
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exhausted all of its administrative remedies, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) allows the company to file suit in Federal Court.2 °3 PlanetSpace
took advantage of this power and sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from NASA. 2" The court forced NASA to explain the reasons why it
rejected PlanetSpace's bid.2 °5 While the company did not get any monetary
relief from NASA, °6 this is a good example of the rights that companies
have under a procurement contract, and shows how limited rights are for
companies under a SAA. Rocketplane's only court appearance was to
entitled to severance payments after the
decide which employees were
20 7
company declared bankruptcy.
IV.

THE

FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE FLIGHT: WHY NASA SHOULD
CONSIDER SOME TYPE OF APPEALS PROCESS

A. A Look at how Other Agencies with OTA Power Work with Private
Companies
While NASA was the first government agency to receive OTA
power, it was not the last. 2 8 As the center of innovation shifted from the
government to the private sector,20 9 Congress recognized the need for
additional agencies to have OTA power. Unlike NASA, the Department of
Defense, Department of Transportation, and the Department of Homeland
Security are allowed to use their OTA power for research and development
agreements. 2' 0 The Department of Defense was given a stronger OTA
power because Congress wanted to ensure that the United States would have
access to the most current technologies in the defense arena.2 '
Some of these other agencies actually have checks on their OTA
The GAO must provide annual reports to Congress detailing the

power.2 12

203 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012) (explaining that the statute contains a Sunset Provision that

removes the authority of District Courts to hear these kinds of suits).
204 See generally PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 520, 525-26 (Fed. Cl. 2010)
(providing an example of the rights a company has under a government procurement contract).
205 Id. at 549.
206 Id. at 526, 549.
207 See Trafton v. Rocketplane Kistler, Inc., No. 08-C-99, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18955, at *4-18
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2010) (showing that Rocketplane did get to appear in court but only to decide which
employees were entitled to payment after the company declared bankruptcy).
208 See generally L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34760, OTHER TRANSACTION

(OT) AUTHORITY 5-6 (2011) (showing that Congress eventually granted OTA power to the Department
of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, National
Institutes of Health, and the Department of Energy).
209 See Dix et al., supra note 2, at 25-26.
210 Id. at 23-24.
211 See id. at 26 (showing an example of an agency whose OTA is stronger than NASA's and the
reasons why Congress wanted that agency to have strong OTA).
212See HALCH1N, supra note 208, at 11, 15, 17 (explaining the power restraints on the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Energy).
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Department of Homeland Security's use of its OTA power.2" 3 The
Department of Health and Human Services can use its OTA power in
connection with a specific program that conducts research for the National
Institutes of Health. 214 The Secretary of Energy must use competitive and
merit-based selection procedures when using OTA power. 2 15 The Secretary
of Energy must also provide a written determination detailing why a
government procurement contract was not feasible for a specific program.21 6
The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security must
submit information about their respective uses of their OTA authority to the
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).217 FPDS is a government-wide
database that tracks agencies' contract actions and is available to the
public.2" 8 The Department of Defense's OTA power is also only available
to "carry out prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or
weapons systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department.
"219
The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security each claim that OTA power greatly reduces the typical cost of a
government procurement contract, yet neither agency has supplied actual
figures detailing the savings and cost effectiveness of OTA agreements.22°
A large problem with OTA power is the lack of uniform guidelines
regarding the applicability of statutes to OTAs.22' Since agencies can really
tailor their OTA power to best fit that agency's need, it is difficult to
monitor OTA power.222 It is equally difficult to evaluate the benefits of
OTA power.223 While many agencies have OTA power, none of them use it
in
same
way. 224 OTA
Sinceand
so typical
many agencies
use contracts.
it differently,
225
there is no
realthe
way
to compare
government
Congress would be wise to mandate data collection to all agencies
with OTA power.22' This would provide a way to compare OTA power and

23 See id. at 15 (providing an example of a limit on an agency's OTA).

Id. at 17.
See id. (explaining that some agencies need to ensure that all of their projects meet certain
requirements that are aimed to keep the process competitive and fair).
214
211

id.
217 See id. at 23 (showing that there is a system that aims to track agency use of OTA).
211 See id. (explaining that a business could use this program to see how past projects utilized OTA).
216

219

Gregory J. Fike, Measuring "Other Transaction" Authority Performance Versus Traditional

ContractingPerformance: A Missing Link To Further Acquisition Reform, 2009 ARMY LAW. 33, 37
(2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220See id at 40-41 (showing that there is no evidence to show that government procurement contracts
are more expensive).
221 HALCHIN, supranote 208, at 22.
222See id. at 23 (showing that it is difficult to measure how each agency uses its OTA since each
agency's OTA is different).
221 See id. at 23-28.

224See id. (showing the differences in how agencies are allowed to use their OTA).
225See generally Fike, supra note 219, at 43 (proving that it is difficult to compare government
procurement contracts and agreements governed by OTA power).
226See id. at 42-43 (explaining how Congress can help bring clarity to the OTA power quandary).
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government procurement contracts on different factors. 227 Congress would
be able to see if OTA power is more cost-effective, the amount of time each
process takes, and see if companies were more successful under an OTA
agreement or a government procurement contract. 228 Congress has actually
taken steps to help regulate NASA's OTA power. 229 House Bill 2687 would
force NASA to make significant changes to its SAA regime.2 3 ° Senate Bill
1317 proposes that NASA use only government procurement contracts when
working with private companies.21 These bills, while not yet law, are an
excellent step towards regulation of NASA's OTA power.
NASA should look to how other agencies provide for some sort of
review through their OTA power. The Department of Energy's requirement
that its secretary provide a written determination for why a typical
government procurement contract is not required would be a good start.232
By forcing the Agency to provide a written determination in each specific
instance, it forces the Agency to take a hard look approach rather than
simply rejecting a bid. Forcing NASA to tell each company why an SAA is
required would lead to the GAO catching NASA using its OTA power in an
inappropriate way. The differences between COTS, CCiCAP, and CCtCap
seem to be slim, yet NASA decided to use SAAs for two of them while
using procurement contracts for CCtCap.233 If NASA were forced to
explain its decisions for using SAAs, perhaps all three programs would have
used the same method of acquisition.
Forcing NASA to log SAAs in the FPDS would be helpful to
business. Since this database is open to the public, companies could log
onto the system and get a general idea of how NASA has weighed bids in
the past. Companies could determine whether or not a bid could be in their
best interest before investing hundreds of millions of dollars into a bid that
NASA would reject.
B. Why Reviewing Its OTA Power Is Also in NASA's Best Interest
If NASA is really trying to foster the growth of the private space
industry in the United States, it should try to provide a more fair work
227 See generally id. (discussing what Congress's help could lead to).

See generally id. (explaining what questions could be answered by Congress's action).
See generally National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2013, H.R.
2687, 113th Cong. § 707 (2013) (proposing certain changes to NASA's SAA practice); National
Aeronautics ara Space Administration Authorization Act of 2013, S. 1317, 113th Cong. § 224 (2013)
(proposing th-qt NASA use government procurement contracts in the future instead of SAAs).
230 See H.R. 2687 § 707 (forcing NASA to submit annual reports to Congress detailing the Agency's
SAA practices over the previous fiscal year).
231 See S. 1317 § 224(a)-(c) (explaining that NASA should use fair, open, and well-defined
government procurement contracts in the future when it works with private companies).
228
229

232 See HALCHIN, supra note 208, at 27.

233See Grondin, supra note 188 (explaining that NASA chose to use a procurement contract for
CCtCap).
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environment. If someone were debating which path to take with their new
space company, one would think that they would always want to partner
with NASA. After these GAO decisions, 34 that person may opt instead to
follow in the footsteps of Richard Branson235 and Robert Bigelow.236 Both
own companies capable of space flight and neither worked with NASA.
These companies are planning to send private passengers on suborbital
flights in the near future. 237 Robert Bigelow's company has already placed
private space stations into orbit with plans to open a space hotel in the
coming years.238 Seven hundred people have signed up for flights on
Branson's Virgin Galactic,2 39 and Mars One, a company attempting to send
humans to Mars, received over 10,000 applications. 24 0 The success of these
companies proves that the public is interested in space tourism.
It is actually a common misconception that NASA is the only
agency that regulates space. If a business was unhappy with NASA's past
behavior, there are other agencies that the business could work with to enter
the space market. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Department of Commerce each have expansive jurisdiction when it comes
to space. 241 The FAA has stated that its jurisdiction in space flight could
increase. 2" The FAA even has the jurisdiction to launch commercial
objects into space. 43
234 See Exploration Partners L.L.C., B-298804, 2006 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 211 (Comp. Gen. Dec.
19, 2006); Rocketplane Kistler, B-310741, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 10 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 28,
2008).
235 See
Alan Boyle, SpaceShipOne Wins $10 Million X
Prize, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6167761/ns/technologyand science-space/t/spaceshipone-wins-million-xprize/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2004, 2:58 AM) (reporting on the successful launch of Spaceship One).
236 See Stephen Clark, Successful FirstStep for Bigelow's Plans in Space, SPACEFLIGHT Now (Aug.
25, 2006), http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n0608/25bigelow/ (discussing the successful launch and
operation of Bigelow Aerospace's first inflatable space module).
237 See Douglas Messier, Private Spaceships for Space Tourists to Launch Big Test Flights,
SPACE.COM (May 23, 2013), http://www.space.com/21278-space-tourist-space-planes-launching.html
(reporting on the growth of the private space industry).
238 See Adam Higginbotham, Robert Bigelow Plans a Real Estate Empire in Space, BLOOMB3ERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 2, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-02/robert-bigelow-plansa-real-estate-empire-in-space (reporting on Bigelow's plans to open private space hotels and private
space stations).
239 Louise Armitstead, Branson Ready for Lift Off with 700 Space Tickets Sold, THE TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 18, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/10319028/
Branson-ready-for-lift-off-with-700-space-tickets-sold.html.
" See Ben Brumfield & Elizabeth Landau, A One-Way Ticket to Mars, Apply Now, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/22/world/mars-one-way-ticket/ (last updated Aug. 9, 2013, 12:03 PM)
(showing that some members of the public are willing to travel to Mars with no way to return).
241 See About the Office, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquarters-offices/ast/about/
(last visited Dec. 12, 2014) (outlining the jurisdiction of the FAA's space office); Office of Space
Commercialization, SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION, http://www.space.commerce.gov/policy/nationalspace-transportation-policy/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) (discussing the jurisdiction of the DOC's space
commercialization office).
242 See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century And Counting: The Evolution of US. National
Space Law And Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 405, 421 (2010)
(explaining how Congress has granted the FAA with incremental jurisdiction to license commercial
space flights since 1984).
243 Id.
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NASA needs to recognize that it cannot keep treating businesses
unfairly. The private space flight industry is at its infancy, and no one truly
knows what tomorrow will bring.2" The "evolving definition of...
commercial" is one of the three long-term issues facing the space industry
today.245 NASA's Administrator should try to implement some type of
review process or create a policy memo detailing the Agency's new method
of providing businesses with access to past OTA behavior and specific
determinations of why OTA power is required in specific circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION

While NASA was the only provider of space transportation for the
United States for decades, that is no longer the case. NASA is trying its best
to work with the emerging private space industry, but the Agency needs to
realize that it is no longer the only avenue for these companies. As the
private space industry grows and develops, this industry could break away
from NASA altogether. The public has shown its interest in space
companies and the industry may chose to pursue private clients instead of
government contracts.
NASA can help this new industry live long and prosper, but it must
do so fairly. The current system lets NASA pick and choose the companies
it wants to do business with and requires no explanation about why it
rejected a bid and accepted another. The current system does not force
NASA to explain why a typical government procurement contract was
unrealistic for the situation in question. Private companies who want to
work with NASA pour lots of money and manpower into these bids on
NASA's behalf. NASA should allow these businesses a way to air their
grievances and be heard. As the private space industry grows the pressure
will soon be on NASA to change its methods. If NASA decides to maintain
the status quo, the Agency that was created to help the United States win the
space race could find itself the ultimate loser of the race instead. Business is
really all about adaptation, and the question for NASA in the future is will
the Agency adapt to meet the demands of its new clientele. If the Agency
refuses to change, the countdown to NASA's demise may have already
begun.

244 See generally Bryan Parrish, Commercializing Space: IntellectualProperty Concerns with Space
Act Agreements, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 651, 688 (2013) (discussing that private space companies will
become less and less dependent on NASA).
245 See Gabrynowicz, supra note 242, at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing emerging
issues for the future of space law).
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